The EU's preparations for a wider Union: my commentary for EPIK
EPIK has published my commentary, The EU's preparations for a wider Union: reflections from Kyiv.
On 6 October the European Commission presented "Preparing for a wider Union": a Communication and a staff working document of almost 150 pages. In June 2022 the EU acknowledged that enlargement would require preparation on its own side. This is its first systemic answer. It is solid, but unfinished in places, and one issue is conspicuous by its absence: reconstruction.
Why I call it systemic
The staff working document reviews more than thirty policy areas one by one and asks of each whether it can work with thirty or more Member States. In most cases the answer is yes, with targeted adjustments rather than rewrites. The weight of analysis devoted to Ukraine's economy, agriculture and energy leaves little doubt about whose accession the exercise is mainly about. And it will have consequences: the proposals will feed into the EU's Common Positions for each cluster.
Several proposals work in Ukraine's favour:
- qualified majority voting for opening clusters and for smaller procedural steps
- observer arrangements in the Council once the Accession Treaty is signed
- a country-specific financial package bridging pre-accession and membership funding
- gradual integration in energy, transport, digital and defence
Three things that matter most for Ukraine
1. Safeguards
The length of the safeguard period matters less than the mechanism. The headlines went to a fifteen-year "probation period". The real questions are the decision procedure and judicial review: Commission measures would take effect unless the Council rejects them by qualified majority. Kyiv should press for objective criteria and effective judicial review. The safeguards say more about the Union's own past experience than about the candidates. Ukraine's best response is a judicial system that nobody feels the need to safeguard against.
2. Agriculture
This is the hardest file, and the real question is how a transition ends. The Commission proposes arrangements that would limit financial support and market access for sensitive products, alongside help in regaining third-country markets. The Communication does not speak of permanent restrictions, so what counts are the conditions and procedures for exit. Transition periods also serve Ukraine's own adaptation to EU standards. My suggestion: a longer transition on standards and a credible third-markets programme, negotiated as one package.
3. Reconstruction
Reconstruction should be treated as a European project, yet the Commission mentions it only in passing. The latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment puts recovery needs at $588 billion. That is potentially the largest market in Europe for the next decade: for Ukrainian firms and workers first, and for European builders, utilities and renewables companies as well. It is also a chance to apply European standards at scale. The Commission should add a chapter on reconstruction to its next analysis.
What comes next
The European Council meets on 15 and 16 October. On 28 October the Commission intends to present the 2026 Enlargement Package with indicative roadmaps. The roadmap is where Kyiv should look for the first concrete answers on access to the Internal Market before accession, the least defined part of the package.
Homework
The EU is looking for systemic solutions rather than offering excuses. Ukraine's side of the bargain has not changed: reforms, above all on the rule of law, that make safeguards unnecessary. And reconstruction, the chapter the Commission has not yet written, is where Ukraine has the most to offer in return.
The full text is on the EPIK website.